Proceedings of the 52nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences | 2019

Toward Technology Transfer Evaluation Criteria
David J. Kasik
The Boeing Company (Retired)
dave.kasik@comcast.net

John Dill
Simon Fraser University
dill@sfu.ca

Abstract
2. Background
Technology transfer is often focused on how to get
novel technology transferred into an industrial using
group or company. We focus in this paper on the target
of the process and present guidelines which can help
assess the likelihood of a successful transfer.

1. Introduction
Someone once told us, as young researchers back in
the beginning of computer graphics, that transforming a
thing that works into something that WORKS is hard
and takes more effort than the initial development. We
didn’t understand it then. Over years of trying to get new
technology successfully adopted in industry (even when
we were directly employed by industry), we gradually
came to understand that the transfer process is neither
easy nor straightforward.
Researchers are often more concerned with novelty
than applicability. They are measured by publications,
and reviewers tend to emphasize novelty much more
than applicability. Of course, a project can do both.
Doing both is much harder than just novelty.
Researchers need to make sure their new method or
technology actually solves a problem that is important
to the business community, that it reduces a pain point.
As Fred Brooks [5] noted:
A toolmaker succeeds as, and only as, the users
of his tool succeed with his aid. However shining the
blade, however jeweled the hilt, however perfect the
heft, a sword is tested only by cutting. That
swordsmith is successful whose clients die of old
age.
Our belief is that new technology that increases
client’s/user’s success is the ultimate target of
technology transition.
In this paper, we examine issues we consider
important in undertaking technology transfer, identify
problems, and develop some criteria/guidelines. We
hope the criteria will help in assessing – and assisting –
both technology and receivers in increasing the
probability that future transfers are successful.
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Moving forward with new technology is a welldiscussed, mature topic. There are clearly numerous
factors that control the rate of adoption. The rate itself
is discussed in [11]. Moore modified the classic
adoption curve to add a particularly large gap, which he
referred to as a ‘chasm’, between the early adopters and
the early-stage main majority. The chasm was meant to
emphasize the significant difference between these
groups. Early adopters are the visionaries whereas the
early majority are pragmatists, only wanting to work
with proven technology, technology that many others
have already used successfully.

Figure 1. Technology adoption curve with chasm
The introduction of the chasm parallels the authors’
experience with technology transfer.
There are
extensive publications on the technology transfer
process itself [11].
Though Moore addresses the marketing of new
technology products by high-tech companies, we
believe his concept applies equally to the transfer of
technology from academia to industrial firms – and
more generally from any R&D group (whether small “r”
large “D” or vice-versa, to any receiving/using group.
What is less clear is that the duration and depth of
the chasm varies significantly. In exploring the reasons
for the different time frames [6], the authors examined
the time it took for large corporations to adopt, even in
a limited manner, new computing technology. Adoption
times varied significantly, from 10 years to not being
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adopted at all. In all cases, adoption times were
surprisingly long.
The hypothesis in this paper is that having a set of
clear guidelines, understandable and available to both
technology developers and potential recipients, would
be useful to both groups. Technology practitioners often
believe that their work is beneficial and applicable to
even the most stubborn customer. Conversely, and not
widely understood, potential recipients on the far side of
The Chasm often find reasons (both rational and
irrational) to reject new technology and prevent
competition with current practice.
The intent of this paper is to develop and present a
clear set of guidelines to assess the likelihood of
successfully transitioning technology from a supplier
(developer/researcher) to an industrial firm. If the
guidelines are applied effectively, such projects should
be more likely to achieve success (or to fail more
quickly), decrease the overall time needed for adoption,
and help bridge The Chasm.
The paper does not attempt to define a rigorous
process to apply the criteria or run a technology
transition project.

3. Proposed Criteria
In our research, we saw dozens of papers that talk
about running technology transition projects, which is
certainly necessary. Our guidelines are independent of
the many different transition project management
possibilities.
There are clearly hundreds of dimensions that can
accelerate or deter technology adoption. In spite of the
breadth and depth exploration of the technology transfer
process, there has been little exploration of the factors
that influence technology transition. [12] did develop
excellent criteria for judging the success of a project.
Our intent is different because we want to increase the
probability of successful transition and therefore
complements Tan’s work.
The authors identified four high-level areas with
factors that influence the adoption of new technology
and developed guidelines to help assess the adoption
opportunity:
• Demonstrated applicability to a company’s
business problems
•

Willingness of the business community to adopt
the concept

•

Willingness of the technical community to support
the concept

•

Adaptability to corporate infrastructure
The general relationships among these factors are
illustrated in fig. 2, which shows the model we have

adapted to describe the technology transfer-adoption transition process.
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Figure 2: Model of technology transition process.
Even though our primary experience is with
computing technology, we assert that our guidelines
apply to transitioning and deploying any new
technology. Inputs (arrows from the left) to the model
are the technology to be transferred/transitioned and the
business problem to be solved. There are two controls
(arrows from the top): what the technology community
or supplier ‘thinks’ and what the business community or
receptor thinks. The environmental infrastructure
(called mechanisms and represented by the arrow at the
bottom) defines the context into which the new
technology must fit or which must be changed to
accommodate the new technology. By applying the
criteria discussed below, we produce the likelihood (the
arrow on the right) that the technology will be adopted.
The process is iterative. Changing the inputs, controls,
and mechanism can increase or decrease the odd of
success.
Primary inputs:
•

•

The technology itself. We don’t restrict the supplier
of the technology to an academic research group: it
could equally well be another company or another
division/department within the receiving company
Applicability to business problems. Applicability
is of course crucial - suggesting that a specific
technology is applicable to a company without a
demonstrated fit makes success virtually
impossible. Note that the need for any imported
technology can change over time. For example,
Boeing hired the U.S.’s leading concrete experts in
the 1960’s to insure success in building Minuteman
missiles in the cold climate of the Dakotas. Once
the project was successfully completed, the experts
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gradually left and were not replaced. Similarly,
GM developed significant computer graphics
expertise in the ‘60s and ‘70s in order to develop its
CAD system, but as third-party firms developed
suitable products and expertise, GM’s need was
correspondingly reduced and they moved from an
in-house system to a vendor-supplied one.
Controls govern the internal rapidity with which new
technology is adopted. The controls can result in a range
of rates from rapid deployment to total stoppage and
include:
• Willingness of the business community. The
business community contains the people, data, and
materials that define and solve specific productrelated problems. This community produces new
knowledge, products, ideas, etc. that others
consume. For example, intelligence analysts are
given problems and data from which they make
recommendations. Political, military, and business
people make decisions based on analyst
recommendations
and
other
information.
Ultimately, the business community will directly
use new technology.
•

Willingness of the technical community. The
business community often asks the technical
community to independently examine the
robustness and suitability of new technology. The
technical community may be inside or outside a
company.
The mechanisms of the corporate infrastructure must
be understood to assess the amount of change that may
be needed to implement new technology in production.
In this case, the mechanism is:
• The existing corporate infrastructure-environment.
Any company, be it a century old or a start-up, has
operational constraints. Infrastructure
mechanisms range from supply chain to drayage to
computing resources to job definitions to available
electrical power to business community expertise.
New technology must be able to fit into the
environment or justify modification/expansion.
For example, all-electric cars work wonderfully as
long as there are reliable charging stations.
Adding stations to make recharging as convenient
and readily available as fossil fuels is happening
gradually.
The model output is the likelihood that the
technology will be adopted. The rest of this section
describes the criteria the authors, both of whom worked
as transfer technology insiders in large companies,
learned that must be considered to improve the chances
of a successful transition of a specific technology.

The authors recommend that readers assess all
aspects listed below early and often to increase the odds
of success. Implementing any technology successfully
is a time-consuming process, often a multi-year or even
multi-decade task. Assessing early and often should
reduce the time taken by ‘The Chasm’ in Moore’s
technology adoption curve and make new technology
more broadly available in a shorter period of time.
By technology community, we refer to the group
supplying the technology to be transferred. This could
be an academic research group or an R&D group within
the (receiving) business community, a start-up
company, or a new supplier.
By business community, we refer to the organization
to which the technology is proposed to be transferred.
Thus the two sides of the transfer process, on
opposites of the chasm, can be in different organizations
or in the same organization. The authors have
experienced both types of transfer efforts. For example,
we have successfully transferred technology from an
academic research group to a large corporate entity and
have been part of successful efforts to transfer
technology from a corporate research division into
manufacturing divisions.

3.1 Applicability to Business Problems
Here we identify issues and topics that must be
addressed within the receptor or business organization
with respect to the problem being solved. The basic
theme is that the probability of success increases when
the business community can be convinced that the new
technology can address real problems. Involving the
business community directly helps get buy-in.
Identify business people who understand the current
situation and can articulate problems.
• When there are multiple business people who
understand the situation, pay attention to the
internal stature of each person. Are you dealing
with a user, or with a ‘chooser’, i.e. the individual
who will ultimately decide to accept or reject new
technology? Are they high enough in the
organization to control the resources needed for
adoption?
•

Examine cause and motivation for the perceived
problem(s).

•

Identify specific cases that are problematic;
generalizations are difficult to sell internally.
Find test cases and data sets for experimentation
•

Willingness to explore specific cases that cause
problems

Page 1592

•

Accept that modifications to new technology may
be needed in case exploration has poor results.

•

Be prepared to deal with difficulties in obtaining
access to data – many ‘owners’ are very protective.
Review results with business people
•

Get first hand reaction to test results

•

discuss with both users and choosers who may have
quite different viewpoints.
Document and communicate what went well and what
didn’t go well
•

Show results outside business circle

•

Get peer review to technical approach

•

If reasonably successful, present to other business
communities
Take results to multiple levels of management
•

Be realistic should there be no perceivable
movement

3.2 Business Community Adoption
Any business community has a set of entrenched
tools and techniques. New technology is often a threat
to adoption.
Adoption odds increase when the
technology-providing organization understands the
existing environment. In short, these criteria help
understand the competition and position the new
technology.
Understand existing technology. If you are proposing
for e.g. a new software tool, make sure you understand
the one in current use.
• Understand the pricing of the current tool set
•

Have an idea of the number of people using the
tools; convincing a few users to change is easy;
persuading several hundred is an entirely different
– and much more expensive – task.

•

Determine advantages new technology may have

Look for places where existing tools have problems that
new technology (must) solve
• Know the limitations of existing tools as applied to
specific business problems
•

•

Understand the limitations in new technology

3.3 Technical Community Support
Most organizations have technical staff who help
assess and position new technology.
In many
corporations, the technical staff is in a separate group,
e.g., the dreaded Information Technology organization
for new computing tools. Internal research groups may
have competing technology and act as a roadblock.
There are a variety of social and psychological issues
related to the business’ technical community that must
be addressed in any effort to transition in new
technology:

Identify additional audiences

• Build case for funding transition
Know when to quit in the face of continued resistance
•

Do not indict existing tools directly
• Most user communities love their existing tools
even if they have issues

Enlist people in the user community who may have
problems to participate in early tests

Invented here
•

Management and users often believe that
technology can't be worth much if someone local
thought of it first.
Not invented here
•

Most user communities have technology advocates
who believe that any technology not invented or
discovered internally is probably inappropriate or
inadequate.
Threatens technical expertise
•

Technical organizations will protect their approach
because of staffing and funding issues

3.4 Infrastructure Conformance
An often overlooked aspect is an understanding of
the actual infrastructure of the receiving organization.
Essentially the better understanding one has of both the
capabilities of the components of the organization and
the capabilities of each, the higher the likelihood of
success. Ideally, new technology is designed to fit into
the infrastructure ab initio.
Organizational impact
• Where are the organizational experts in
existing technology?
• Impact on existing tools and methods
• Salary and job descriptions
• Market demand for specific skills
• How to provision for a broader community
• Training
• For truly new technologies, how to supply
skills when demand increases

Page 1593

Technical infrastructure impact
• Understand existing tools and their support
structure (e.g., standards)
• Impact on physical resources (e.g., compute
and network power)
• Gaining access to data
• Information security

4. Applying the Model: Selected Examples
Since hindsight is 20-20, we applied the model
(Figure 2) to multiple projects in which one of us
was directly involved. We identify the criteria that
was most influential in making the project a
success or failure.
4.1 GM CAD
The application that pushed the initial development
of computer graphics was computer-aided design; early
research took place at MIT with Sutherland’s Sketchpad
and at GM Research with DAC-1 in the early ‘60s. At
GM, CAD was ‘sold’ to upper management as a way to
reduce cost. In practice, it was used to explore more
ideas in the same time, thus producing better designs,
but at little actual cost savings.
The technology community - researchers at GMR –
spent a considerable effort in studying what their
business community really wanted [10]. As Krull noted
[10], one of the first things the research group
(technology supplier) did was to hold discussions with
their business community – the Design and Engineering
Staffs – where specific tasks were identified (see criteria
in section 3.1) The question that was being asked was,
“How could computational techniques significantly
impact the design process?” Additionally, multiple
levels of management were involved, from a high level
Styling manager down to individual designers (section
3.1 item 1). Documentation was extensive, including
publication – peer review (see section 3.1). The result
was the DAC 1 system which was in essence a very
successful ‘existence proof’ that was used to
demonstrate capability.
To cross the gap, both a more capable system was
needed and additional work was required along the lines
of the items in section 3.2 with the internal business
community in the form of the motor divisions.
Considerable effort was spent to convince their design
management of the probability of success, of the
probability that this new technology would actually save
money and time. It was a difficult line for the technical
community to walk however, since once the managers
became convinced, they wanted it all, immediately, and

getting new technology into production of course is
never immediate.
In this case, our fig. 2 model would suggest a high
likelihood of success, given the extensive engagement
with the business community and the understanding of
the corporate infrastructure and indeed the project was
successful, resulting in one of the earliest production
CAD systems.

4.2 Boeing CAD
Boeing moved into the world of CAD in the late
1970’s as it developed the 757 and 767. The initial
choice of tools targeted producing engineering
drawings: computer-aided drafting rather than
computer-aided design tools. The FAA insisted on
drawings as the build authority, and Boeing staff was
accustomed to the drawing process. Both airplanes were
commercial successes. The 757 ceased production in
2004 because of fuel consumption. It has yet to be
replaced by either Boeing or Airbus. The 767 is still in
production as a freighter and as the basis for the KC-46
tanker.
Boeing quickly realized that the underlying
mathematics in drawing systems needed to handle 3D
surfaces and solids. Therefore, the company started the
TIGER research program in 1980 and launched a
commercial product called Axxyz. The underlying
math basis was non-uniform rational b-splines
(NURBS) [4].
From a technologist perspective, the developers
achieved significant success.
From a business
perspective, the project failed. Looking at the criteria in
section 3, showed that:
• The developers did not accommodate import from
or export to other CAD systems until the late
1980’s. They believed that all work could be done
in Axxyz.
• Direct user involvement was limited and occurred
grudgingly. In fact, most ‘users’ were part of an
intermediary organization and not doing design
work directly.
• The user community was happy producing
drawings.
• A business commitment caused Boeing to purchase
CAD software from Dassault Systemes in 1988.
Since Boeing wasn’t using Axxyz (the commercial

variant), the project died.
4.3 Boeing Massive Model Viewing
Designing aerospace products often stresses
visualization software to its breaking point. Boeing
developed FlyThru, a heavily used Silicon Graphics-
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based viewer, in the early 1990’s [3]. FlyThru displayed
as much geometry as could be fit into an SGI’s memory,
about 5% of the geometry needed to represent a
complete airplane.
A PC-based viewer called IVT (Integration
Visualization Tool) appeared in the early 2000’s that
mimicked FlyThru in both function and capacity. The
primary users were for the 787, which doubled the
amount of 3D geometry over the 777.
The development group had worked with the
academic
community
to
stimulate
software
development to produce software that could
interactively display an entire 777. The field became
known as Massive Model Visualization (MMV) [14].
The resulting IVT extension, called Superviewer,
has been in production use since 2006. While making
Superviewer a production capability, it was not used
widely until 2013-2014. Looking back at the Section 3
criteria, Superviewer did well by:
• Finding commercial software (a library called vgr
[2] that could be integrated directly into IVT. This
made the user community happy because they did
not need to learn a new interface.
• Requiring little change to IVT software
infrastructure.
• Using the same data as ‘regular’ IVT.
• Engaging end users to evaluate as development
progressed.
Broad adoption slowed because:
• The groups that have used Superviewer most
extensively did not appear until ~2012. The
developers assumed that design reviews would
benefit most. It turns out that manufacturing and
support have had significantly more benefit.
• Modification of IVT functions to work with
Superviewer progressed slowly because of funding
limitations.
• Pre-processed Superviewer-formatted data did not
exist until the early 2010’s.
• Technical staff argued for other commercial
viewers that did not scale.
• Research staff developed their own special
purpose viewers and did not care about MMV
scale.
Based on this, the odds of success were medium.
Engagement to understand the breadth of applicability
occurred much later than it should have.

4.4 Microtel Pacific Research and Intelligent
Graphic Interface
The technical problem was managing complex
hierarchical networks such as power distribution
networks or telecommunications networks [9]. The
technical community however was a combination of an
academic research group and an industry applied
research group (MPR), with the business community
being the parent company of industry research group.
This effort was a technical success, and having spent
considerable effort on the issues of 3.2 and 3.3, at least
got to the prototype stage, but ultimately the project
faded in part due to not understanding the infrastructure
of the business community well enough and not getting
sufficient buy-in from senior levels of management in
the business community.

4.5 Continuous Zoom and Thoughtshare
Here, a successful research project on visual
navigation of the web [8] was spun into an ultimately
unsuccessful startup [1] because the founders didn’t pay
enough attention to their business community, i.e. to the
marketing. They failed to identify specific business
problems that their technology would solve. So while
the technology was successfully transferred into the
startup from a research lab, the startup failed to pay
enough attention to their ‘business community’. The
model in fig. 2 would suggest a very low likelihood of
success (see 3.1).

5. Assessment
The long-term basis for technology transfer is
understanding the overall success of the technology
adopters, not the developers. Looking at projects ex
post facto shows applicability as a way to assess the
cause of project success or failure.
A part of future work in this area would be to apply
the guidelines to current ‘hot’ topics (e.g. augmented
reality, artificial intelligence, machine learning, virtual
reality, driverless cars) and track progress over time.

6. Conclusion
In this paper we’ve developed a model of the process
of transitioning new technology from a “development
group” we called the technical community, into a “using
group” which we called the business community. The
model is based on experiences, some even successful, in
technology transfer. Our model included basic inputs the technology and the problem being solved – along
with controls – viewpoints of both communities – and
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the mechanism of understanding the infrastructure of the
receiving community. Using this, one can get a measure
of the likelihood of achieving a successful transfer. We
elaborated each of these items and described specific,
real examples of technology transfer and tried to relate
those to the model.
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